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ABSTRACT
This paper examines changes since the early 1960s
in the export shares of the United States and its major
competitors in the markets of the developing, countries of the
Asian Pacific Rim (APR), defined to include Hong Kong, Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, thePhilippines,Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia, and China. A technique for revealing a country's
factor—price advantages or disadvantages in its trade with
another country is also used to analyze the U.S. comparative cost
position relative to the countries of the region. Among the
findings are that the U.S. export share in the APR market has
reniained roughly constant over the period and that the United
States has a relative factor-price advantage with all the
developing countries of the region in physical capital and
skilled labor and a disadvantage in unskilled labor. For land
and natural resources, the picture is mixed.
The competitive performance of these developing countries in
the markets of the United States, Canada, Japan, the European
Community, Australia and New Zealand, and in the region itself is
also studied, revealing the familiar result that the developing
countries of the region and Japan have increased their market
shares significantly since the 1960s.In addition, the volume
and distribution of U.S. and Japanese direct investment in the
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1. INTRODUCTION1
The ability of the major developing countries ofthe Asian
Pacific Rim (APR) -HongKong, the Republic of Korea (henceforth
referred to as Korea), the Republic of China (henceforthreferred
to as Taiwan), the Philippines, Malaysia,Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, andthe People's Republic of China (henceforth
referred to as China) -tocompete in the markets of the United
States is well-known and frequently citedby many domestic
industries as a matter for national concern. Much lessis known
about the competitive performance andpotential of American
industries in the markets of the major developingcountries of
the APR and interest in this matter isonly beginning to
develop;' it will be the focus of this paper.
The following section provides an economic overviewof the
APR by comparing the main economic characteristicsof the
countries in the region and those of the regionas a whole with
other major groupings of countries.Sincethe prospects for
exporting goods and services to the countries of theregion
depend on the policies these countries follow in such mattersas
1 am indebted to Jeffrey Steagallfor research
assistance in preparing the paper and also toGary Sampson of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development inGeneva for
providing the export and import data on the developing countries
of the Asian Pacific Rim. 1promoting economic growth and the openingof domestic markets,
the third section briefly describes the economic policiespursued
by each APR country in the recent past. This section also
analyzes the success of major trading partnersin penetrating the
market for imports in each country andhow successful each
country has been in exporting to major foreignmarkets. Finally,
the trade and development policies likely tobe followed in the
future in each country is briefly discussed insection three.
Section four analyzes the competitive performanceof the
United States and its major competitors inthe markets for
imports in three groups of APR countries:the advanced developing
countries (ADCs) of the region -HongKong, Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore; the resource-rich countries (RRCs)of the region -the
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia;and China. It
also examines changes since the early 1960s in theshares of the
import markets in these APR country groups capturedby the United
States, Canada, Japan, the European Community,Australia and New
Zealand, and other countries within the region, togetherwith
changes in the commodity composition of exportsto the APR groups
from these countries and country-groups. A technique for
revealing the sources of a countrys comparative advantageis
used to determine the relative factor-price advantagesand
disadvantages the United States has in itstrade with the
countries of the region.
Section five briefly looks at the performance of the three
APR country groups in exporting to the United Statesand other
2major foreign markets and examines changes sincethe early 1960s
in the share of their exports absorbedby the United States and
other countries and shifts in thecommodity composition of their
exports.
Because trade and investment areclosely linked, it is
necessary to take foreign investment into account inevaluating
U.S. competitive prospects in theregion. Section six examines
the volume and country distribution ofdirect foreign investment
in the region by the United States and itsmain competitor in the
area, Japan. Changes in the relative importance of U.S.direct
investment in different sectors in the APRcountries are also
studied. The final section summarizes themain conclusions of
the paper.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICSAND PERFORMANCE
2.1 The Developing Countries of APRCompared to Other gions
The tremendous market potential in thedeveloping countries
of the Asian Pacific Rim liessimply in their being not only the
most populous but the fastestgrowing region of the world. The
population of the nine countries totals 1.33billion, whereas
that of the next most populous region,South Asia, amounts to .87
billion.Gross national product (GNP)per capita in the nine
countries grew at a remarkableaverage rate of 5.75% between 1965
and 1984. In contrast, GNPper capita in the industrial market-
economy countries increased at an average rate ofonly 2.5%
during this period and at average rates of1.9% in both South
3Asia and the countries of South America (World DevelopmentReport
1986, Annex Table 1).
Table 1 compares the APR countries with a selected groupof
countries outside of the area in terms of basiceconomic
characteristics and performance indicators. Except for the
Philippines, per capita income grew much more rapidlyin the
developing countries of the Asian Pacific Rimthan in mature
developed countries such as the United Statesand West Germany
and, in most cases, even Japan, the newestand most dynamic
developed country.Yet, though per capita income levels in the
APR countries rank among the highest for all developing nations,
there is still a wide per capita income gap between theadvanced
industrial market economies and these countries.West Germany's
1984 per capita income, for example, is more than fivetimes as
large as South Korea's and almost seventeen times as large asthe
Philippines' per capita income in that year.
The magnitude of the APRs output and imports is also small
when compared to that of the developed countries.The total of
all nine countries' gross domestic product in 1984 was $656
billion, only slightly more than one-half of Japan's and notmuch
greater than West Germany's GDP.The difference in imports is
less striking due to the high degree of dependence ontrade of
most countries in the region. Their total 1984 imports of $181
billion are roughly equal to those of Japan and of West Germany
in that year. Thus, the major market opportunities for the
United States are still in other developed countries; the major
4developing countries of Southeast Asia and East Asia represent an
important potential market rather than a major current one.
Compared withother developingregions, however, the
developing countries of the Asian Pacific Rim already rank as the
largest market. The 1984 $656 billion GDP level of the region
compares with GDP levels of $623 billion for all of South
America, Central America, and the Caribbean and of $406 billion
for South Asia, for example.Moreover, the 1984 $181 billion
import level of the region compares with only $64 billion for
South America, Central America, and the Caribbean and $25 billion
for South Asia.This market-size advantage is likely to widen
during the rest of the century, given the currently higher growth
rates in the Pacific Rim countries.
Table 2 shows the growth and trade experience of the APR and
selected other countries before and after the first oil crisis.
The general slowdown in growth in both the developing and
developed countries after the first oil shock is evident from the
table. It should be noted, however, that the relative decline in
growth rates has been less in the APR countries than in such
developed countries as the United States, Japan, and Germany. In
the United States, the percentage decline in the average annual
growth rate of GDP between 1965-73 and 1973-84 was 28%; in Japan,
56%; and in Germany, 57%.The average annual GDP growth rate
actually increased in Hong Kong and Malaysia (also India) and
declined by only 18% on the average in the other seven developing
countries in the Asian Pacific Rim.
52.2 Diversity among the APR Countries
As shown in Table 1, thereare significant economic
differences among the developing countries of the Asian Pacific
Rim. It is usual to divide the countries into three groups, the
first comprising South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore;
the second consisting of the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Indonesia; and the third being China. The first group is usually
designated the "newly industrializing countries" (NICs) of Asia,
a term indicating their relatively early emphasis on export-
oriented industrialization. While the words, "newly industrial-
izing," were appropriate in the ].960s and early 1970s when they
first adopted policies aimed at significantly increasing the
exports of manufactures, it seems more appropriate to use Hong
and Kraus&s (1981) term, "advanced developing countries" (ADCs),
especially since other countries of the region later also adopted
policies aimed at export-oriented industrialization.Per capita
income in all of the ADCs is higher than in the countries of the
other two groups, though if per capita income alone is the basis
of the classification, it would seem reasonable to include
Malaysia in the first group.There is also a significant gap
between income levels in Singapore and Hong Kong and in Taiwan
and South Korea.
The second group of four nations is usually described as the
resource-rich countries (RRCs) to indicate the much greater share
of primary products in their exports compared to the ADCs (see
Table 3)2 Thegreater share of production devoted to
6agriculture is an indication of theirgreater land resources as
well as their lower per capita incomelevels. Except for
Malaysia, the RRCs are less open than the ADCs ofAsia in terms
of trade's share of GDP, and thesecountries have pursued import-
substitution policies more vigorously thanthe ADC.Another
difference is the higher natural rate ofpopulation growth in the
RRCs than in the ADCs.3
China is unique in severalrespects. It is by far the most
populous country in the world and it ranks third inarea. Though
it has become much moreoutward-looking in recent years it
remains, as the export and import sharespresented in Table 1
indicate, a very closed economy compared toother countries in
the region, although not incomparison to such countries as India
and the United States. While its GDPgrowth rate since 1965
compares favorably with the RRCs', China's lowper capita income
level makes the country more similarto the countries of South
Asia than to those of the Asian PacificRim.
2.3 Savings Investment, ForeignDebt, and Trade 4justment
A necessary, though notsufficient, requirement for a
country to raise its growth rate is to increase itsinvestment
and savings rates significantly. As Table 4 shows, such an
increase has occurred in the ADCs, theRRCs and China. In five
of the nine countries, investmentas a share of GDP rose by more
than ten percentage points between 1960and 1984, and in three
others the increase was at least fivepercentage points. The
1984 investment ratio in Singaporewas an incredible 47 percent,
7and it was 30 percent or more in Taiwan, Malaysia, and China.
The increase in domestic savings has been even more impressive,
especially in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea,and
Indonesia. The rate of gross domestic savings is now about 30
percent or more in six of the nine countries. The only developed
countries that can match these savings rates are Japan (31
percent) and Norway (35 percent).
An excess of domestic investment over domestic savings
indicates that savings by foreigners are financing part of a
country's investment activities. Such was the case for the ADCs
in the initial phases of their take-off to high rates of growth,
as the figures in Table 4 on the resource gap indicate.The
large positive number for Hong Kong in 1984 indicates that
domestic savers were investing some of their savings abroad,
probably because of their uncertainty about the political future
of the colony.
A more direct indication of the extent to which a country
has relied on external sources of finance is the magnitude of its
external debt and the ratio of the external debt to the country's
GNP. The debt-service share of exports of goods and services is
a rough indicator of the degree of difficulty the country hasin
meeting its external obligations.Table 5 presents information
on these various debt indicators for the APR countries, except
for China, on which debt data are unavailable.As with
developing countries generally, the data show a very rapid
increase in external borrowing for APR countries over the last 15
8years.This ability to draw upon external sources,especially
private capital markets, has been an important factor in enabling
growth to continue at high rates. It has, however, also led to
serious debt-servicing problems for some nations that borrowed
heavily and then around 1980 were suddenly faced both with much
higher real interest rates and falling prices for theirexport
products. Four APR countries -SouthKorea, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Indonesia -areon most lists of countries faced
with significant debt-servicing problems; debt-servicingcharges
in 1984 claimed more than 15% of the foreign exchangethey earned
from exporting goods and services. The drain ofdebt-servicing
on the foreign exchange earnings of Singapore and Hong Kong is
negligible and only about 5% for Taiwan and Malaysia.
Obviously, in order to cope with increased debt-servicing
charges, a country must generate additional foreign exchange by
improving its balance of trade.Table 6 shows that the trade
balance of the four main indebted countries, SouthKorea,
Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia improved between 1983
and 1985. Korea, whose balance of trade has improvedsteadily
since 1981, achieved the most desirable type of tradeadjustment
between these years -anexpansion of imports and exports.
Thailands improved trade balance between 1983 and 1985came
about through an expansion of exports and contraction ofimports.
The recent trade adjustment in both the Philippines and Indonesia
was achieved by reducing both exports and imports.
93. DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND TRADE PERFORMANCE
As with most developing countries in the world, the major
economic goal of those in the ksian Pacific Rim over the last 40
years has been to increase the rate ofeconomic development.
Their success in achieving this goal and the extent to which
their development policies involve a willingness to open their
own markets to the products of other countries largely determine
the trading opportunities of the United States and others in the
region. This section briefly describes the nature of the
development strategies pursued by the individual APR countries
and analyzes the shifts that have taken place in the commodity
composition and geographical distribution of their exports and
imports. It also speculates as to each country's likely future
trade and development policies.
3.1 The Advanced Developing Countries
3.1.1 Hong Kong
3.1.1.1 Trade and Development Policy
The British colony of Hong Kong is unique among developing
economies in that it has achieved its remarkable post-World War
II growth under a policy of "positive nonintervention."Imports
and exports of both goods and capital have been completely free
from government taxes, subsidies, or other controls, and no
effort has been made to direct investment into particular
sectors. The standard tax rate on earnings and profits is the
lowest of any industrial state, being set at the level of 12.5%
10from 1951-1966.
Until the early 1950s, Hong Kong'sprosperity was based on
re-exporting products from South China throughout theworld and
serving as an entry port for foreign productsdestined for the
mainland. Two external events in the 1950sdisrupted this
entrepôt role. The first was the change ofgovernment as the
Communists took control of the mainland.Their inward-looking
policies resulted in a significant diminutionin Chinas trade
with Hong Kong.Dissatisfaction with the new government led to
massive emigration from China to HongKong that increased the
colony's population by almost 50% in a fewyears. The second
event that reduced Hong KOng's roleas a trade facilitator was
the United Nations embargo imposedon China because of its role
in the Korean War.
Fortunately, the Chinese immigrants includedentrepreneurs
who had both industrial experience,especially in textiles, and
the capital necessary to establishmanufacturing activities.
Utilizing the abundant supply of low-wageworkers that also
becameavailablethroughimmigration;theseindividuals
spearheaded the shift in Hong Kongs economicstructure front that
of entrepôt to exporter of labor-intensivemanufactured products.
The industrialization effort was alsohelped by the existence of
an excellent infrastructure of port,banking, insurance, and
shipping facilities, and a long history ofcommercial ties with
overseas traders. Manufacturing employment increasedfrom 82,000
in 1950 to 216,000 in 1960, whilethe share of re-exports in
11total exports declined from 88% to 27% in that decade.
3.1.1.2 Trade Performance
As can be seen from Table 7, which indicatesthe colony's
pattern of exports and imports in 1960,1978 and 1983, Hong Kong
has gradually diversified its manufacturingactivities and, in
particular, reduced its dependence ontextiles and clothing.
Exports in the machinery and transport equipmentcategory have
become significant.The diversification has been due in part to
the efforts of the government, which, beginning inthe late
1970s, backed away somewhat from its hands-off policyand began
to arrange industrial support facilities andtechnical services
to facilitate the shift toward more capital-intensive, high-skill
manufacturing sectors.
A more detailed breakdown of the composition of Hong Kongs
trade with its major trading partners is presented inTable 8.
Between 1963 and 1980 both the United States and Japan moderately
increased their share of the combined exports to Hong Kong bythe
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand,the
European Community, other ADCsthe RRCs in the region, and
China.The U.S. share increased from 16% to 18%. The countries
that increased their export share the most, however, werethe
other ADCs, i.e., Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore; their share rose
from 8% to 16% between these years despite the exclusion fromthe
figures of exports from Taiwan to Hong Kong in1980 (and 1984).
The European Community and the four resource-rich countries -the
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, werethe losers
12in. terms of export shares between 1963 and 1980.
The major change between 1980 and 1984 was theemergence of
China as a major supplier to the Hong Kong market. In 1984
almost 30% of exports to Hong Kong came from China. Ofcourse,
much of this reflects the re-emergence of entrepôt trade forHong
Kong as China became more open. The U.S. market share declined
about a third between 1980 and 1984 (from 18% to12%), due no
doubt in part to the appreciation of the dollar relative toother
major currencies after 1980. Japan's share also declined between
these years but less in relative terms than the U.S. share.
Table 8 also shows the country/region distribution ofHong
Kong's own exports between 1963 and 1984.The share of exports
to the United States increased from 35% in 1963 to50% in 1970
and then declined to 41% by the end of the 1970s, a decade in
which the dollar depreciated.As the dollar appreciated in the
early 1980s, the share of Hong Kong's exports absorbed by the
United States again rose to 50%. Remarkably, the share of
exports absorbed by Japan remained at about 4% over the entire
period.The trend in the EC share was downward over the period
with an especially sharp fall evident after 1980.
The main factor in Hong Kong's long-term economic outlook is
the coming return of sovereignty to China in 1997. Theagreement
reached in 1984 between Great Britain and China called for the
maintenance of Hong Kong's market-orientedeconomy for at least
50 years after 1997, but, despite this provision, there is
understandably a great deal of uncertainty about the future.
133.1.2 Singapore
3.1.2.1 Trade and Development Policies5
The economy of Singapore, like that of Hong Kong, was for
many years based on entrepôt trade, specifically,the processing,
repackaging, andre-exporting ofthe primary products of
Southeast Asia to other areas and the re-exporting of imported
industrial goodsto other parts of Asia. Following the
attainment of self-government in 1959, the Singapore.governnient
adopted an industrialization strategy that has passed through
three stages: an import-substitution phase from 1960 to 1966; a
labor-intensive, export-oriented phase from 1966 to 1970; and
since 1970, a higher-technology, skill-intensive phase that is
also export-oriented (Yue, 1980).
The first phase, in which tariffs and quotas were used to
stimulate domestic manufacturing, was closely tiedto the
prospect of a Malaysian common market, including the former
Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak.
Government officials thought that this market would be of
sufficient size for Singapore to become an efficient supplier of
manufactured products, given temporary protection. But the
political union of the four states lasted only from 1963 to 1965,
and with Singapor&s withdrawal from the federation, the proposal
for a Malaysian common market collapsed.
Although import protection was increased toease the
domestic adjustments related to the country's withdrawal from the
14federation, the development strategy shifted around 1966 to one
of attracting foreign investment to expand exports of labor-
intensive manufactures. In addition to establishing new tax
incentivestoattractforeigninvestors, the government
introduced restrictivelabor legislationto restrain wage
increases and maintain stable labor relations, restructured the
educational system to provide more technicalworkers, and
providedawiderangeoffacilitiesand services to
industrialists. Theoutcomewasarapiddecrease in
unemployment, an increase in the share of domestic exports in
total exports from 25% in 1965 to 38% in 1970, and a marked
acceleration of the growth rate.
As the upward pressure on wages increased due to the success
of these measures, Singapore shifted to a new development
strategy in the early 1970s, emphasizing exports of skill-
intensive, higher-technology products.To stimulate the export
of these products, the government provided equity and loan
assistance to firms producing them, expanded training facilities
and gave financial support to private-sector training activities,
allocated funds for financing export bills below the prime rate,
subsidized the insurance of export activities, and undertook
extensive export-promotion programs. Beginning in 1969, most
tariffs and quotas were reduced or abolished to enable exporting
firms to obtain needed inputs at competitive world prices, andby
the mid-1970s, Singapores level of protection wasvery low.
The extentto which Singapore has relied on foreign
15investment to increase its exports of manufactured goodsis
indicated by the fact that, in 1980, export sales by wholly
foreign-owned firms constituted 72% of the economy'stotal
exports of manufactured goods, exportsales by joint ventures
21%, and export sales by wholly locally-ownedfirms only 7%.
Another notable feature of the country's development policyis
the high rate of domestic savings, achieved by compulsory
retirement contributions by employers and employees. By 1978the
contribution rate reached 38.5% of wages and salariesand
contributed 22% of total national savings. The governmenthas
used these funds to provide an infrastructure that isconducive
to development.
3.1.2.2 Trade Performance
Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore never relied on textiles and
clothing as an important export product, as Table 9 shows. Its
industrialization via the export route has been based mainly on
oil refining and, to an increasing extent, on skill—intensive
machinery and other manufactures. Industrialization has also
expanded the market within Singapore for high- skill, high—
technology products, as the changes in the country's import
pattern indicate.
The United States has done very well in the Singapore market
(Table 10), increasing its export share from 7% in1963 to 21% in
1984 -aperformance that outdid the Japanese export share
increase.The other ADCs also gained in market share, while the
EC and, especially, the RRCs lost in relative terms. On the
16export side, the figures show that the shares of Singapores
exports taken by both the United States and Japan rose between
1963 and 1984, the U.S. from 13% to 27% and Japan from 8% to 12%.
As would be expected from exchange rate developments, the
increase in the share of exports going to the United States was
especially large between 1980 and 1984. Shipments to other ADCs
also increased in relative terms over the 21-year period. In
contrast, the share of Singapore's exports received by the EC
fell from 29% to 12% from 1963 to 1984.
There is no alternative for Singapore, if it is to continue
to raise its living standard, but to remain an open, export-
oriented economy.At the same time, one can expect to see a
continued shift in the composition of its exports toward higher
labor-skill products, while importing high-technology goods as
well as products where scale economies are important.
3.1.3 Korea.
3.1.3.1 Trade and Development Policies6
From 1945 to 1960 Korea followed an import-substitution
development policy, using high protective tariffs, quantitative
import restrictions, and a multiple exchange-rate system with a
generally overvalued currency to stimulate domestic production
for local markets. While growth was fairly impressive during the
1950s, it was largely induced by substantial U.S. aid following
the Korean War; 74% of Korean investment was financed by foreign
aid between 1953 and 1960. The growth rate began to decline in
17the late 1950s as the easy import-substitution opportunities were
exploited and U.S. economic aid was reduced. The degree of
inwardness of the economy at that time is indicated by the fact
that exports of goods and services were only 3% of GDP in 1960;
by 1980 they had climbed to 36%.
A significant shift in Korean development policy toward an
outward-looking strategy occurred after the student revolution in
1960 and the military coup in 1961. The won was devalued and a
unitary exchange-rate system established, the interest rate was
permitted torise toencourage domesticsavings, and a
stabilization program was implemented. A nunber of export
incentives were introduced, including exemption from tariffs on
imported inputsand capitalequipment for use in export
production, accelerated depreciationoncapital facilities
employed in export production, and a lowering of direct taxes on
income earned from exporting. Exporters also had access to
credit below the market-rate of interest, received preferential
electricity and transportation rates, and were granted generous
wastage allowances on imported inputs.
In the late 1970s another change in development policy
occurred as the government, fearing that Korea was losing its
competitive advantage in labor-intensive manufactures due to
rising real wages, began to encourage the production of capital-
intensive intermediate products. This policy shift was reversed
in the early 1980s and priority again given to export expansion
as the major engine of growth.
18The rate of growth that followed theshift in development
strategy toward export promotion canonly be described as
phenomenal. Per capita incomes rose atan average annual rate of
7% between 1960 and 1980. During the export—led industrial
transformation, the share of manufactures intotal exports
increased from 14% in 1960 to91% in 1983 (Table 11), and
domestic savings as a fraction of GDProse from 1% to 30% between
1960 and 1984 (Table 4).
A feature of Korean policy of considerableconcern to the
United States and other industrialcountries with which Korea has
a large export surplus is the continuinghigh level of protection
in both the agricultural and industrialsectors that makes it
difficult for foreign suppliers to sell inthe Korean market.
3.1.3.2 Trade Performance
As Table 12 indicates, the UnitedStates' export share in
the Korean import market, afterfalling sharply from 49% to 31%
between 1963 and 1970, increasedslightly to 34% between 1970 and
1980 and then remained constant thereafter.Japan was the main
gainer at U.S. expense between 1963 and 1970with its share
rising from 35% to 49%, but this share had fallenback to about
41% by 1984.Australia and New Zealand, Canada, and theRRCs
have all gained steadily in market sharethroughout the 21-year
period -
Thedistribution of Korean exports exhibitsconsiderable
volatility. Exports tothe United States, for example,
constituted 50% of all exports to theregions listed in the first
19column in 1970, rising from 32% in 1963,then dropping to 35% in
1980, only to rise again to 46% duringthe period of dollar
appreciation in the early 1980s.The share of exports sent to
Japan shows a steady decline overthe entire period.Exports to
the European Community display an upwardtrend.
Because the country's poor endowmentof natural resources
and comparatively small size leave noalternative for achieving
continued rapid growth but to retain the emphasis onexporting
manufactured goods, Korea is likely to remain anoutward-looking
economy. Like Singapore, it canbe expected to move into higher-
skill, more capital-intensive export production,however. At the
same time, with some prodding itshould become a better market
for high-technology goods and agricultural products.
The Republic of Korea's relations with NorthKorea are of
major concern to the United States.Because of the perceived
threat of aggression from the north, theUnited States still
maintains military forces in South Korea andhas a treaty
commitment to the country's security. The U.S. governmentfavors
gradual reunification between Northand South Korea but there
seems little prospect for that in theshort term. Yet, the
prospect for reasonably peaceful relations between the two
countries in the short term seems favorable.
3.1.4 Taiwan
3.1.4.1 Trade and Development Policies7
There was great political and economic turmoil inTaiwan in
20the period immediately after World War II. The end offifty
years of Japanese rule and thus the loss of the country's
traditional export market was followed by the Communists' take-
over of mainland China, the immigration of large numbers of
Nationalists from the mainland and their assumption ofpower in
Taiwan, and the loss of another important market in China.
The government's first response to the economic problems it
faced was to undertake a land reform program in the agricultural
sector and an import-substitution policy with high levels of
protectionforthemanufacturing 'sector; The Country's
adjustment efforts were assisted by a substantial inf low of
foreign aid, mainly from the United States.Between 1951 and
1959, 37% of total investment was financed by foreign aid.
Beginning in the late 1950s and into the early 1960s, the
government 'introduced policies that changed Taiwan's development
strategy from one of import substitution to one that emphasized
the exportof labor-intensive manufactures. The multiple
exchange'-rate system was abolished and the overvaluation of the
country's currency corrected by a series of devaluations. Import
controls were eased and tariffs reduced on many manufactured
goods. (As in Korea, the Taiwanese government still highly
protects some domestic industries with import controls and
tariffs.) Investment by foreigners and local residents was
encouraged by such measures as a five-year income tax holiday for
certain new industrial establishments, a sharp reduction in the
maximum business income tax, and tax exemption for undistributed
21profits retained for investment purposes. Exporting was also
encouraged directly by rebating customs duties on imported
inputs, permitting the deduction from taxable income of an amount
equal to 2% of annual export earnings, and allowing a 10% tax
deduction for manufacturing, mining, and handicraft firms that
exported more than 50% of their output. In addition, some
industries received direct export subsidies that were financed by
levies on domestic sales. Low-interest loans and government
assistance in the form of marketing, managerial, and technical
services were also available for exporting activities. Beginning
in the mid-1960s, the government also established duty-and tax-
free export-processing zones.
3.1.4.2 Trade Performance
As in the Korean case, the post-World War II development
policies of Taiwan transformed the country from an agricultural
to an industrial economy within a comparatively short period. In
the period 1952-54, industrial exports made up only 9% of total
exports, but in 1970 the share of industrial exports in total
exports was up to a level of 78% and by 1982, to 88%.
AsTable 13shows, changes in the country/regional
distribution of Taiwan's imports between 1963 and 1984 are
similar to those of Korea. The U.S. share of imports into Taiwan
declined sharply from 43% to 26% between 1963 and 1970, then
increased to 33% in 1980 and remained constant thereafter. As in
the Korean case, Japan's export share rose considerably between
the first two years (from 35% to 52%), then declined to 40% by
221980 and remained there over the next fouryears. The EC's
export share also rose over the entire period. In contrast to
the Korean case, however, the export share of theother ADCs
rose, while that of the RRCs fell.
Since the UNCTAD Trade Data tape does not containexports
from Taiwan for 1980 and 1984, thecountry/region composition of
Taiwanese exports is only given for 1963 and 1970. Theseyears
do show the marked shift in the direction of Taiwaneseexports
toward the United States. From accounting foronly 20% of these
exports in 1963, the U.S. share had increased to 44%by 1970.
The CommUnity's share rose slightly, but themost significant
other shift between these years was the fall inJapan's share
from 38% to 17%.
Like Korea and Singapore, to achieve continuedrapid growth,
Taiwan has no alternative but to concentrateon exporting
manufactured goods, but it can be expected to shifttoward
higher-skill_requiring, more capital-intensive products.As it
is pressured to liberalize its own tradebarriers, Taiwan should
improve as a marketfor high-technologymanufactures and
agricultural products.
There is, of course, considerableuncertainty about the
political future of Taiwan. In proposing unification, China has
offered to make Taiwan a special administrativeregion, following
the Hong Kong approach, and allow it to maintain itseconomic and
social system.Thus far, however, no visible progress has been
made toward reunification, despite TaiWan'sincreasing political
23isolation in the world. The official position of the U.S.
government seems to be that a gradual and natural processof





Thedevelopment policy of the Philippines since the late
1940scan becharacterizedas initially one of import
substitution, then a series of modest and short-lived efforts to
liberalizethetrade and exchange-rate regimes.Exchange
controls were first introduced in late 1949 as a consequence of a
balance-of-paymentscrisis caused immediately bythe election-
relatedeasy creçlit andliberalspndirtgpoiicies of the
governmentandmore basically by the countrys overvalued
currency and pent-up demand for consumption goods. Rather than
lifting the controls after the crisis passed, the government used
them during the 1950s to promote the development of domestic
manufacturing activities. As often happened in developing
countries that follow this strategy, growth rates initially were
quite high, but by the late 1950s, as theeasy stage of import
substitutionhad passed, theyhadfallen significantly.
Devaluation, the elimination of most exchange controls, and
the establishment of a unified exchange-rate system occurred in
the early 1960s, but these changes were in response to charges of
24maladministration of the controls and pressures from traditional
exporters rather than to a conscious decision to promote exports
of manufactures. High tariffs still protected the manufacturing
sector, although its growth rate fell even further in the early
1960s. An effort in the late 1960s to stimulate growth through
credit and fiscal expansion led to a new balance-of-payments
crisis and the re-introduction of exchange controls.
The 1970s began with the floating of the peso and the
passage of legislation aimed directly at stimulating exports of
non-traditional agricultural and manufactured goods. Firms
exporting more than 50% of their output were exempt from sales or
customs taxes on materials used inexport production and
permitted to deduct part of their export revenue from taxable
income. The government also constructed the first export-
processing zone. -Partlyin response to these measures but
probably due more importantly to the 50% decline in real wage
costs in manufacturing between 1969 and 1974, there was sustained
growth in manufacturing exports until 1981 (Alburo and Shepherd,
1986). The share of manufacturing exports in total exports rose
from 12% in 1970 to 44% in 1980.
Further liberalization efforts were undertaken in the early
1980s, the most important of which was the reduction of tariffs
under a new, more rational system of import protection, but the
exchange crisis of 1983, related to the countrys external debt
problems, prevented the full implementation of the measures as
exchange controls were introduced once again. Since 1984 the
25cutoff of foreign capital, the austerity measures the government
was forced to adopt, and the political crisis in the country have
brought about a decline in real GNP.
3.2.1.2 Trade Performance
The commodity distribution of the Philippines' •exports and
imports is given in Table 14. Primary product exports other than
minerals have declined significantly between 1960 and 1983 as the
share taken by manufactured goods rose from 4% to 50%.Due to
the greater importance of fuel imports, the share of imports of
manufactured goods fell from 75% to 65% between 1960 and 1983.
The Philippines is another case where the U.S. share of the
country's import market decreased significantly between 1963 and
1970, while Japan's share increased significantly (Table 15). The
U.S. export share rose in the 1970s and, despite the exchange
rate developments,, rose again in the 1980s. The other major
gainers were the ADCs, whose share of the Phillippines' imports
went up from to 2% to 11% between 1963 and 1984. In contrast,
the Japanese and EC export shares of the Philippine market fell
in both of these periods.
The country/region distribution of Philippine exports shows
a decreasing dependence on the United States as a trading
partner. The share of the country's exports sent to the United
States declined from 47% in 1963 to 27% by 1980. The share of
exports taken by Japan rose somewhat from 1963 to 1980; the EC
share remained about the same. The most important shift was the
increase from 3% to 11% in the relative importance of the ADCs as
26an export market between theseyears. This may be related to the
establjshnient of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), since Singapore, an ADC, is an ASEANmember. Export
share of the other ASEANmembers, which are RRCs, remained
roughly the same, however.
The economic history of thePhilippines over the last forty
years and the present political turmoil do notgive reason to
expect the country to shift its developmentstrategy in the
foreseeable future and focus onbecoming an outward-looking
exporter of manufactured goods. Periodicattempts to liberalize
can be expected, but the conflictingeconomic and political
pressures within the country seem likely to result inthe same
pattern of on-again, off-again governmentcontrols on trade and
development that has been seen over the lastforty years. Yet,
because of the richness of its human andphysical resources, the
Philippines is likely to continue togrow at a respectable rate.
U.S.concernswiththePhilippinesgo beyond the
historically close political and economicrelationships between
the two countries. Clark Air Force Baseand Subic Bay Naval Base
are the largest overseas American air andnaval facilities, and
they are generally regarded as vital toa U.S. military presence
not only in the Pacific but also in theIndian Ocean and Persian
Gulf. It would be a severe blow to U.S.military strategy if a
Philippine government forced the United Statesto relinquish
control over these bases. Sincepoor economic performance in the
Philippine economy contributes to thepossibility of such an
27outcome, the United States may wish to considerestablishing
closer economic ties with the Philippines, for example, by
granting thecountrymore favorable treatment under the
Generalized System of Preferences or perhaps negotiating a free
trade arrangement with the country.
3.2.2 Malaysia
3.2.2.1 Trade and Development Policies10
Peninsular Malaysia (the former Malaya) achieved political
independence In 1957; Sabah and Sarawak became independentand
part of Malaysia in 1963. Fortunately, Malaysia already had a
per capita income that was considerablyabove the other three
resource-rich countries.As in most developing countries, the
Malaysian government began its industrialization endeavorswith
import substitution fostered by moderate levels of protectionand
generous fiscal incentives, such as were providedin the Pioneer
Industries Ordinance in 1958 and the broader Investment Incentive
Act in 1968.In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a deliberate
effort was made to promote exports. This included permitting a
double deduction from taxable income for export expenses and a
further tax deduction based on Malaysian raw material and wage
costs.Free-trade and export-processing zones, in which firms
can freely import materials and capital goods used in export
production, were also established in various parts ofthe
country. Furthermore, the government provided low-cost export
insurance, helped to keep shipping rates low, and engaged in the
28promotion of Malaysian exports throughout the world.
The country's development efforts have beensuccessful in
achieving an impressive degree of diversificationof both
primary-product and manufacturing activities. Forexample, palm
oil and timber production has increased to thepoint that these
sectors are now as important as the rubber andtin industries as
earners of foreign exchange. Impressive processing activities
have been established in the palm oil andrubber sectors. The
oil and natural gas industries have alsobecome major export-
earning industries.Textiles and apparel, electricalmachinery,
and, especially, electronics products havebecome important
export items as well.As can be seen from Table 16,exports of
manufactured products increased from 6% of totalexports in 1960
to 22% in 1983.
3.2.2.2 Trade Performance
The Malaysian import figures for 1963seem unreliable, due
perhaps to its political union with Singapore inthat year.
Subsequent data show a steady increase in the shareof the
Malaysian import market captured by the United States, thisshare
rising from 11% in 1970 to 16% by 1984 (Table17). Japan's share
increased significantly between theseyears, from 4% to 25%,
while the ECs share decreasedsignificantly. Import trade with
the ADCs also rose appreciably butdropped with the other RRCs.
The country/region distributionofMalaysian exports
indicates that the United Statesgradually increased its share
between 1963 and 1980.11 Shipments toJapan, the AIDCs, and the
29other RRCs remained about the same over the time period; those to
the EC fell in relative importance.
Malaysia has been successful in achieving an export-oriented
industrialization strategy that is based on processing its
abundant natural resources and on utilizing its abundant supply
of low-cost labor.There would seem to be no major reasons why
this pattern will not continue, at least in the medium term.
3.2.3 Thailand
3.2.3.1 Trade and Development Policies12
The modern industrialization efforts of the government of
Thailand can be said to have begun with the establishment in 1959
of the Board of Investment, set up to promote domestic investment
with the use of tax incentives, and a new, mildly protective
customs schedule was put into effect in 1960.The government
also influenced industrial expansion by means of entry controls
and the use of preferential credit arrangements.The net effect
wasadevelopmentpolicythatto some extent favored
manufacturing industries producing for the domestic market.
With the passage of the Export Promotion Act in 1972,
greater attention was given to the promotion of manufactured
exports.Its provisions included exemption from paying import
duties on imported materials used in production for export, the
exemption from business taxes on export-producing activities, and
a Bank of Thailand discount facility at below- market rates for
short-term export loans made by commercial banks. Since 1972
30exporters are also eligible for a 20% rebate onelectricity
charges incurred in export production. The Department of
Commerce began export—promoting activities in 1975.
Beginning in 1974, as the sharp increase in the price of oil
caused a deterioration in the country's balance ofpayments,
there was an increase in industrial importprotection. Nominal
protection on import-competing manufactured goods increased from
35% to 50% between 1974 and 1978 (World Bank, 1980). Greater
increases in business taxes on imports thanon comparable
domestic products, the imposition of importsurcharges on certain
products, and the increased use of import controls were other
policies favoring import-substituting activities. The debt
crisis of the early 1980s and a sharp deterioration inThailands
terms of trade brought about further import restrictions.
3.2.3.2 Trade Performance
Despite the somewhat contradictory nature of Thailand's
recent development policies, export growth has beenvery high in
the last decade (Table 2), with exports of textiles andapparel,
machinery and equipment, and other manufactures continuing to
make up an increasing share of the country's totalexports (Table
18).
As in a number of the other APR countries, the U.S. share of
Thailand's imports from its major trading partners decreased
between 1963 and 1970 as Japan's share increased (Table19). In
the Thai case, however, these share changes were notas great as
in the other cases. The pattern of a U.S. sharegain and a
31Japanese loss in the 1970s, as thedollar depreciated, and the
reverse of these changes in the 1980s, asthe dollar appreciated,
also took place in Thailand. The EC share inThailand's imports
fell steadily throughout the period. The other important change
in export shares was the increase in the ADCsshare from 11% in
1963 to 22% in 1984. The share of the other RRCsin exports to
Thailand remained about the same over the period.
The share of Thailand's exports absorbed by theUnited
States rose significantly from 10% to 22% between1963 and 1984.
Shipments to the EC also increased betweenthese years but only
from 23% to 27%. japan's share fell after 1970 from 30%to 17%.
Interestingly, Thai exports to other RRCs and the ADC5diminished
in relative importance over the entire period.
The Thai government's policy of modest intervention inthe
market economy seems likely to continue into theforeseeable
future and to result in high growth rates and a growing degreeof
export-oriented industrial diversification.
3.2.4 Indonesia
3.2.4.1 Trade and Development Policies23
Indonesia has been the least successful of the resource—rich
countries in shifting from an inward-looking policy that protects
domesticproducersof manufactured products from foreign
competition to a strategy of promoting exports ofmanufactures.
The 8% share of manufactures in total exports in 1983 (Table 3)
is much lower than that for the other three RRCs.The unusual
32richness of its resources and especially itsability to take
advantage in export markets of the sharp oil price increase in
the 1970s may in part be responsible for this lowmanufacturing
share by reducing the balance-of-paymentspressures for the
expansion of manufactured exports.
Four separate periods can be distinguished sinceIndonesia
achieved its independence in 1949: the period ofconstitutional
democracy (1950-57);the "Guided Democracy" of 1958-1965; the
liberalization of the "New Order" (1966-1971); anddevelopments
up to the present after the period of liberalization (Pitt,
1985). The first period saw sporadic attempts to dismantlethe
elaborate system of foreign exchange controls andimport quotas
that had existed under Dutch rule. Butlobbying pressures on the
government to grant preferential import privileges to thenew
class of indigenous importers and tomonopolistic organizations
of domestic industrial firms formed toimport a common raw
material tended to undermine these liberalization efforts.
The second period, 1958-1965, was markedby President
Sukarnos implementation of his concept of "guideddemocracy"
under which there was an aversion to free marketsand foreign
capital.The traditional Dutch trading houses werenationalized
so that by 1959 only 20% of the import trade remained inprivate
hands. The government allocated all foreignexchange and, in
doing so, favored inward-oriented state enterprises.Moreover,
the gOvernment's policy of allocating raw materialson the basis
of a firm's existing productive capacityencouraged the expansion
33of capacity, though this capacity was under-utilized; in 1965
manufacturing as a whole operated at only between 20% and 30% of
capacity.
The period 1966-71 saw sweeping liberalization in Indonesia,
beginning with a scheme to encourage exports that permitted
exporters to sell a portion of their foreign exchange earnings at
free-market prices. The government ended the direct allocation
of foreign exchange to manufacturing firms and importers were
permitted to buy almost any good they wished. Subsidies and
preferential credit rates to state enterprises were cut sharply.
Another important change was the enactment of a law to encourage
foreign investment by exempting firms that undertook priority
investments from taxes on as much as 60% of their profits for up
to six. years. A unified exchange-rate system was established in
1970.
In the period immediately after the liberalization phase,
the new government shifted back toward import substitution with
the increased use of quantitative import controls, including the
banning of imports of many consumer goods, an increase in
tariffs, and the introduction of numerous regulations covering
investment activities. In 1978, however, the currency was
devalued and an export certificate scheme was introduced that
tended to subsidize exports of manufactured goods. This led to a
significant percentage increase in such exports, though starting
from a very low level. Nevertheless, the governments policies
are still biased toward capital-intensive, import-substituting
34activities and include cumbersome regulations that discourage
exports of labor-intensive manufactures.
3.2.4.2 Trade Performance
Unlike in the other countries analyzed, the structure of
Indonesian production has not shifted significantly toward
export-oriented manufacturing. Only 7% of the country's exports
were manufactured goods in 1983 (Table 20), while the share of
fuels, minerals, and metals in exports rose from 33% to 80%
between 1960 and 1983.
The country/region composition of lndonesian imports (Table
21) shows a rise in shares from both the United States and Japan
between 1963 and 1970 and a decline in the export shares of the
ADCs, the RRCs, and the EC. In the 1970s the U.S share fell and
Japan's increased, while in the 1980s their shares remained
unchanged. In contrast, the share of imports from the Community
increased in the 1980s. Imports from the ADCs dropped sharply
from 19% to 5% between 1963 and 1970 but remained roughly
constant thereafter.
Indonesian exports to both the United States and Japan rose
significantly in the 1970s, while exports to the EC and the ADCs
fell appreciably during this period. In the period of the l980s
covered in Table 21,the percentagedistribution of the
destination of Indonesian exports remained roughly the same.
As in the Philippines, there do not seem to be any strong
reasons to expect that Indonesia will change its development
strategy from that of recent years. Strong vested interests have
35been created that favor an inward-looking industrialization
strategy, and they are likely to continue to prevail in the
politicaldecision-making process determining development policy
into the foreseeable future.
3.3 China
3.3.1 Trade and Development Policies14
Undoubtedly, thedeveloping country in the APR whose
policies are of greatest potential significance to the United
States and other competitors in the region is China. The
modernization reforms initiated inthelate1970s could
eventually transform the Chinese economy into both a major
competitor and market in the area and the world. But the
possibility of a return to Maoist economic policies, involving
autarky and a de-emphasison theacquisition of Western
technology, cannot be ruled out.
China's current trade policies are aimed at increasing
exports in order to pay for the capital equipment, intermediate
inputs, andadvanced technology needed for industrial and
agricultural modernization. One means of stimulating exports has
been the establishment of Special Export Zones in which Western
know-how, managerial skills, and capital can be combined in joint
ventures with low-wage Chinese labor.As Table 22 indicates,
the share of exports of manufactures in total exports equaled 57%
in 1983, with textiles and clothing being the most important
export category.Among the country's primary product exports,
36crude petroleum and petroleum products have become increasingly
important.
Encouraged by government policy, foreign investment in China
exceeded $3.5 billion by 1985, but firms doing business in China
face many difficulties, including arbitrary tax •and tariff
charges, inadequate suppliesof skilledlabor,poor
transportation and communication facilities, and the resistance
of vested interests to the economic reforms.
3.3.2 Trade Performance
After U.S. trade with China opened up, the United States
quickly became an important supplier, furnishing by 1980 about a
quarter of China's imports from its major market-oriented trading
partners (Table 23). The U.S. share dropped to 18% by 1984,
perhaps reflecting the overvalued dollar. Japan's share rose
from 11% in 1963 to 43% by 1984, and the ADCs became more
important as exporters to China over the period, whereas the
shares of exports supplied by the EC and Australia and New
Zealand declined between these years.
Chinese export figures are only available for 1984 on the
UNCTAD Data Tape. The 42% share going to Hong Kong indicates the
importance of that colony as an entrepôt for China. Japan is the
next largest recipient of Chinese goods at 27% and the United
States and the European Community each absorbed about 12% in
1984.
It seems much too early to predict, even in the medium term,
what China's future role in the world trading and foreign
37investment system will be.
4. THECOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
MAJOR COMPETITORS IN THE APR MARKET
Intheprecedingsectionthe major country/region
distribution of the imports and exports of each of the nine
developing countries in the Asian Pacific Rim was examined. As
is apparent from this analysis, no single pattern emerges as to
how well the United States has competed in the area. In three
markets -Singapore,Malaysia, and China, the share of U.S.
exports in total exports from the Countries' major trading
partners was greater in 1984 than in 1963.In four countries-
the Philippines, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Thailand, this export
share declined but by six percentage points or less. In two
countries, Korea and Taiwan, the U.S. share of exports dropped by
more than ten percentage points over the period. Interestingly,
except for Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan ship a larger proportion
of their exports to the United States than any other countries in
the group.
In only two countries, Hong Kong and China, is there a more
than 5% decline in the U.S. export share between 1980 and 1984,
when the dollar appreciated significantly. Indeed, the U.S.
export share rose between these years in the Philippines,
Singapore, and Malaysia.During 1970, however, when the dollar
depreciated against the major currencies, the U.S. share of the
export market increased in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Philippines.Furthermore, in all of these
38countries the share of exports supplied by the United Stateswas
higher in 1984 than in 1970. In four countries -Thailand,
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, the U.S. competitiveposition
worsened between 1963 and 1970. (Data are not available for
these two years for China and Malaysia.)
Table 24 indicates the importance of developing countries of
the APR as an export market for the United States. (Also see
Naya, 1986.) The shares of total U.S. exports going to the ADCs,
the RRCs, and China all increased between 1968 and1982, the
combined share for all three rising from 6.5% in 1968 to13.1% in
1982.If one adds Japan's share of U.S. exports to these
figures, which increased between 1968 and 1982 from 8.5% to9.9%,
the combined exports of the United States to themajor developing
and developed countries of the APR constituted 15.0% of allU.S.
exports in 1968 and 23.0% in 1982.There is no doubt that the
Asian Pacific Rim is becoming a major area of export interestto
the United States.
Table 25 examines the success in trade of the United States
relative to its major competitors in the import markets of
developing countries of the APR, not on an individual-country
basis but in the ADCs and the RRCs asgroups of countries, and in
China. The competitive record of the United States is shownto
be a mixed one.The U.S. export share in the import market of
the ADCs in the area remained at around 20% between 1963 and 1984
-20%in 1963, 18% in 1970, and 21% in both 1980 and1984,
whereas its share of the goods exported by the majorsuppliers to
39the four RRCs dropped steadily from 24% in 1963 to 16% in 1984.15
In contrast, after U.S. trade with China was opened, the U.S.
share of the Chinese market rose to 27% by 1980, then declined to
18% in 1984.
For the region as a whole, the trend in the •U.S. export
share was slightly upward, moving down from 21.6% in 1963 to
19.0% in 1970 but then rising to 23.5% in 1980 and remaining
almost unchanged at 23.2% in 1984, despite the sharp appreciation
of the dollar. The significance of this upward trend in export
performance in the APR market can be appreciated by noting that
the U.S. share in world exports declined between 1963 and 1984,
falling from 14.6% in 1963 to 13.6% in 1970 and 11.0% in 1980 and
then rising slightly to 11.2% in 1984.
The most successful competitor in the APR market was Japan.
Its shares of total exports to the ADCs, the RRCs, and China from
the countries listed in the first column of Table 25 rose for all
three between 1963 and 1984.By 1984 Japan was their largest
supplier, supplying 30% of the ADCs' import market, 26% of the
RRCs' import market, and 43% of China's imports from the
countries listed.The main loser in competition for sales in
these markets was the European Community; its export shares
declined steadily in all three parts of the APR market over the
21-year period.
An important change in the markets of developing countries
that is only beginning to be appreciated (e.g., see Ahmad, 1985)
is that the more advanced developing countries are beginning to
40be important suppliers of manufactured goods to other developing
countries. This is clearly occurring in the APR market. As
Table 25 shows, the export share of the ADCs in their own import
market increased from 8% in 1963 to 12% by 1984, while their
export share in the RRCs market rose from 1% to 10% between
these years. The less industrially advanced RRCs did not
participate in this trend, however; their shares to the ADCs and
to other RRCs declined over the period.
Another aspect of the growing importance of the market for
international goods in the developing countries of the APR is
that total exports to these countries by the United States,
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the European Community, as
well as by the countries of the region to each other, amounted to
2.97% of world exports in 1963, 3.56% in 1970, 4.74% in 1980, and
5.85% in 1984.
Changes in the commodity composition of U.S. exports to the
ADCs, the RRCs, and China between 1968 and 1982 are indicated in
the first part of Table 26.The comparative advantage of the
United States in agricultural products and high-technology goods
is evident.As would be expected, agricultural imports are more
important for the resource-scarce ADCs and China than for the
RRCs. For both the ADCs and the RRCs, exports of machinery have
grown significantly in relative importance over the period, from
21% for the ADCs in 1963 to 34% in 1982 and from 30% to 49% for
the RRCs between these years. The relative decline in exports to
China of machinery between 1975 and 1982 may reflect special
41circumstances. Another commodity class that gained somewhat in
relative importanceover the period is chemicals, whereas
transportation equipment declined.
Further insight into whichcategoriesofgoods the
competitors in the APR market have been successful n exporting
can be gained by utilizing Krause's (1982) breakdown of goods
into four groups: natural resource-intensive, unskilled labor-
intensive, technology-intensive, and human capital-intensive.
Table 25 divides the exports to the APR of the United States and
its competitors into these four categories. As would be
predicted under the factor-proportion theory of international
trade, the commodity groups in which the United States has the
largest marketsharearenatural resource-intensive and
technology-intensive. In trade with the ADCs, the U.S. export
share increased modestly over the 1963-1984 period for both types
of goods. For the RRCs, the U.S. export share declined for
natural resource products -anot-unexpected result -andalso
for technology-intensive products, though less than in the other
product categories. U.S. performance in the import market of the
APR countries declined, as expected, for labor-intensive products
and also,rather surprisingly, for human capital-intensive
products. As Table 27 indicates, the fastest growing category of
exports to ADCs and RRC5 was, except for the 1980-84 period,
technology-intensive goods. The United Statesis in the
fortunate position of specializing in commodities for which
market demand is growing rapidly.
42Another picture of the nature of U.S. exports, utilizing the
U.S. Department of Conunerce (1976) breakdown of allgoods into
those that are technology-intensive and non-technology-intensive,
is presented in Table 28. The analytical assumption behind this
division is, of course, that temporary differencesamong coun-
tries in developing and introducing new technologicalknowledge
are the basis for differences in the commodity composition of
trade.Though not always explicit, the ability to create new
technology and undertake innovation depends, in turn, on there
being high levels of research and managerial•skills. The table
shows that over the 1968-1982 period the United States has
shifted the composition of its exports toevery country or region
toward high-tech goods. Imports from every region have moved in
this direction, but the percentage by whichtechnology-intensive
exports to the world by the United States exceed technology-
intensive imports was still about the same in 1982 as in 1968.
Consistent with the factor-proportion theory, Table 25 shows
that the main U.S. competitor in the APR, Japan,gained market-
share position over the period in the ADCs, the RRCs, andChina
in technology-intensive and human capital-intensivegoods, while
it lost in the labor-intensive category.The EC lost in every
category between 1963 and 1984, whereas the ADCs gained in export
shares within their own market inevery category, registering an
especially impressive gain in the high-technology group.
A technique developed by Hilton (1983) provides still
another means of revealing the comparative-cost position of the
43United States vis-à-vis the countries of the Asian PacificRim.
It involves regressing the ratio of U.S. exports to U.S. imports
to a country by commodity on the cost sharesof capital,
unskilled labor, skilled labor, land, and other natural resources
in the individual commodities. The coefficients on thevarious
factor shares are a measure of the differences inrelative
factor-prices between the United States and the other country.
If, for example, the coefficient on a particularfactor is
positive, this implies that the relative priceof the factor is
lower in the United States than in the other country. A negative
sign means that the factor is relatively cheaperin the other
country and, thus, that the other country has a comparative
advantage in producing goods in which that factorconstitutes a
relatively large proportion of production costs.
-
Theresults of regressing bilateral export/import ratios for
the United States and the countries of the APR for (in most
cases) over 200 commodities on a five-fold divisionof factor
shares for these commodities are presented in Table 29.For all
the countries listed, the United States has a relative factor-
price advantage in skilled labor and a disadvantagein unskilled
labor. Furthermore, for all countries except Indonesia (and that
coefficient is not significant at the 10% level or better), the
United Stateshas a comparative factor-price advantage in
physical capital. As expected, the United Stateshas a
comparative advantage in land—intensive and natural resource-
intensive products vis-à-vis Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea.The
44land coefficient has the wrong (but not significant) sign for
Singapore, while the negative sign on the natural resource
coefficient reflects Singapore exports of refined petroleum.
The four resource-rich countries, Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Indonesia, all have a factor-price advantage in
both land and natural resources relative to the United States.
The U.S. trade pattern with Japan reveals that the United States
has a relative factor-price advantage in natural resources, land,
and capital and a disadvantage in unskilled labor. Interestingly,
though not quite significant at the 10% level, the coefficient on
skilled labor indicates that Japan has a comparative price
advantage in this factor, too.
5. EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE APR
Although thispaper isprimarily concerned with the
performance of the United States and its competitors in the APR
market, data has also been collected on the performance of the
developing countries of the region in the markets of the United
States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the European
Community, and in the region itself.Analysis of the trade of
the individual countries in section 3 revealed that every country
except the Philippines shipped a larger proportion of its exports
to the United States at the end of the period covered (usually
1984) than in the beginning (usually 1963).In most cases, the
increase was very significant. In contrast, the share of exports
from Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand to Japan
45declined over the period, while the export shares from Hong Kong
and Malaysia to Japan remained unchanged. Only the export shares
of Indonesia and Singapore to Japan rose. The share of exports
taken by the EC declined for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Hong Kong,
remained aboutthe samefor Singapore,Taiwan, and the
Philippines, and increased for Korea and Thailand.
The relative position of the APR countries as sources of
imports for the United States is given in Table 24. The
developing countries of the region supplied 6.5% of all U.S.
imports in 1968, 10.7% in 1968, and 14.7% in 1982. The share of
the ADCs in these figures rose from 53% in 1975 to 63% in 1982.
Adding Japans import share to the shares of the developing
countries bringsthe figures to 19.1%, 22.7%, and 30.5%,
respectively, in the three years.
The U.S. export share to the developing countries of the APR
rose 6.5 percentage points between 1968 and 1982, while the U.S.
import share from these countries increased 8.2 percentage
points. The U.S. export share to Japan rose 1.2 percentage
points, and the U.S. import share from Japan rose 3.2 percentage
points in the same period.
The most important category of imports into the United
States from the ADCs and China is textiles and apparel (Table
26). The proportion that these goods make up of total U.S.
imports from the ADCs is declining, but textiles and apparel have
become more important in U.S. imports from China. Oil and gas
was the main import from the RRCs in the early part of the period
46covered, but by 1982 the 30% share for this categorywas matched
by a 30% share for imports of electricaland electronic
machinery. Electrical and electronic products are alsoan
important category of imports from the ADCc.
The change in composition of U.S. imports fromthe APR
developing countriestoward more complex products such as
electrical and electronic machinery is alsoapparent from Table
28, which divides all imports into technology-intensiveand non-
technology-intensive goods. As this table indicates, imports
from all the countries or regions listedare becoming more
technology-intensive.
6. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE APR COUNTRIES
Achieving a market position abroad by means of direct
foreign investment., in addition to exporting goods, has becomean
increasingly important element in corporate stategy over the last
25 years. Table 31 indicates the extent to which U.S. and
Japanese companies have pursued this strategyin the APR
countries. Although total Japanese dirct investment inthe ADCs
and RRCs combined is nearly $2 billion more than U.S.investment,
American investment in the ADCs is greater thanJapans, $4.2
billion versus $3.5 billion. In view of Japan's lackof natural
resources, it is to be expected that Japanese direct investment
in the RRCs is greater. Japan's investment in oil-richIndonesia
alone amounted to 46% of its total investment in theAPR. Korea
and Hong Kong were Japan's next most important directinvestment
47markets. Hong Kong followed by Indonesia and the Philippines
were the most important U.S. investment markets in the area.
Tables 32 and 33 provide additional information on U.S.
direct investment.Table 32 indicates the share of total world
U.S. direct investment received by individual APR countries and
industries in these countries. U.S. direct investment in the APR
is a small but rapidly growing proportion of total U.S. direct
investment, its share of total U.S. direct investment rising from
3.6% in 1977 to 6.7% in 1984. The shares in each country except
the Philippines increased between these years. The most impor—
tant APR countries for U.S. direct investment in 1977 (and, as
seen in Table 31, also in 1980) were, in order of relative
importance, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In 1984
the ranking was Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Philippines/Malaysia.
U.S. investment in the region is focussed more on the
primary and service sectors than on manufacturing, which absorbed
only 3.6% of total U.S. manufacturing investment abroad in 1984,
whereas the shares were 8.7% for petroleum, 10.7% for banking,
6.4% for trade, and 4.7% for banking.Indonesia and Malaysia
were the major countries in which U.S. petroleum investments were
made. U.S. investment in service activities went mainly into
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines.
Table 33 shows the industry distribution of U.S. direct
investment in each country in 1977 and 1984. Except for
Indonesia, there has been a relative shift away from investment
i.n primary-productsectors and toward manufacturing and/or
48service activities. In Korea and Taiwan the relative importance
of U.S. manufacturing investment declined between 1977 and 1984,
perhaps reflecting their advancing industrialization.The share
of investmentin manufacturingincreased significantly in
Malaysia and Singapore and remained about the same in Hong Kong
and the Philippines. Service activities investment increased in
relative terms in Korea, Hong Kong, and the Philippines.
7. CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of
the economic performance of the United States and its competitors
in the developing countries of the Asian Pacific Rim, defined to
include Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. First, and perhaps
most important, is that the APR is a rapidly growing, though
still small, international market for goods and services and
foreign direct investment. Exports to the countries of the
region by their major trading partners, defined as the United
States, Canada, Japan, the European Community, Australia and New
Zealand, and the APR countries themselves, amounted to 3.0% of
total world exports in 1963 and 5.8% in 1984. The area also has
become relatively more important as a market for U.S. exporters,
the share of total U.S. exports going to the APR rising from 6.5%
in 1968 to 13.1% in 1982. If Japans share of U.S. exports is
added to these figures, the share of U.S. exports taken by the
developed and developing countries of the APR moved from 15.0% in
491968 to 23.0% in 1982.
The United States has performed quite well in competing with
the other major trading partners (defined as in the preceding
paragraph) of the APR countries. The U.S. export share of this
market rose from 21.6% in 1963 to 23.5% in 1980 and remained near
that level in 1984, despite the appreciation of the dollar
relative to the currencies of Japan, the countries of the
European Community, and other U.S. competitors in the region
after 1980. Within the region, the U.S. gained slightly in
market share in the markets of the ADCs (defined as Hong Kong,
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), moving from 20% in 1963 to 21% in
1984, but lost in the RRCs (defined as the Philippines, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Indonesia), falling from a 24% share in 1963 to a
16% share in 1984. In the Chinese market the United States had
no market position in 1963, but by 1984 the U.S..share of China's
imports from its major trading partners was 18%.
The major competitor of the United States in the region is
Japan. In 1984 japan's share of the ADCs' market was 30%, as
compared to the U.S. share of 21%, and the Japanese share of the
RRCs' market was 26% compared to the U.S. share of 16% in that
year. Japan supplied 43% of China's imports from its major
trading partners in 1984, whereas the United States supplied only
18%.
Japan has also been the most successful competitor over the
period in terms of gains in market shares.In 1963, for example,
the U.S. and Japanese shares of imports into the ADCs and RRCs
50from their main trading partners were about the same, whereas, as
noted above, in 1984 Japanese market shares exceeded the U.S.
shares by about ten percentage points. The biggest loser in the
competition for market shares has been the European Community.
The ECs shares of the market for foreign goods in the ADCs and
RRCs were only slightly below those of Japan and the United
States in 1963, but they are now below the ADCs as suppliers to
the ADCs themselves and to the RRCs.The rapid growth in the
market shares achieved by the ADCs is one of the most important
developments in the area. It must be recognized that these
countries are beginning to supply an increasing proportion of the
market for manufactured goods in the APR.China, too, is now
taking an appreciable part of this market.
The various methods used to reveal the comparative-advantage
position of the United States in'the region indicate, as would be
predicted from the factor-proportion theory of international
trade, that the United States has a competitive advantage in
commodities utilizing relatively large capital and skilled labor
factor shares. Furthermore, in the resource-scarce ADCs, the
United States has a comparative advantage in land-intensive and
other natural resource-intensive commodities. The United States
tends to be at a disadvantage in producing labor-intensive goods
in the entire market and in land-intensive and natural resource-
intensive goods in the RRCs.
One observes the results of these basic factor conditions in
the commodity composition of U.S. exports to the region, that
51tend to be concentrated in natural resource-intensive goods, such
as agricultural products, and in technology-intensive goods,that
require relatively high professional and managerialskills to
market successfully.It is in these that the United States is
competing most successfully against its export rivalsin the APR
market.One would expect this pattern to continue, though it
must be recognized that not only Japan but the ADCs and RRCs are
shifting into the high-tech area. The United States must
continually upgrade its level of high-tech products to maintain
its market positions in the APR market and other world markets.
Market opportunitiesfor the United States depend on
economic and political conditions in the countries of the region
as well as on U.S. competitive abilities. It seems that the
present APR governments will continue to pursue export-oriented
economic policies.. There is, however, some political uncertainty
stemming from outside pressures in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and from
both outside and inside pressures in Korea. It is conceivable but
unlikely that these pressures could bring government changes that
would reduce market opportunities in these countries. Even with
the present governments in Korea and Taiwan, the United States
needs to apply pressure for the removal of their import barriers.
There is considerable political uncertainty in another
important market for U.S. goods, the Philippines. One would
expect economic policies to continue as they have with alternate
cycles of liberalization and control, resulting in a moderate
rate of growth. But there is also the possibility of a political
52shift resulting not only in more inward-looking economic policies
but in the removal of U.S. military bases from the country. In
Indonesia there are also strong political interests favoring
import-substitution over export-promotion policies.Unlike the
ADCs, resource-rich countries like Indonesia and the Philippines
are not forced to promote exports of manufactures to produce a
politically acceptable growth rate.Thailand and Malaysia are
not only rich in resources but have adopted policies to utilize
theirabundantsuppliesof unskilledlabor to produce
manufactured goods for export. They should continue to do well,
but like the other countries must be pressured to open their own
markets to a greater extent.
While this paper has been mainly concerned with the export
opportunities of the United States and others in the APR market,
data have also been collected on the performance of the APR
countries in world export markets. The picture that emerges is a
familiar one.. The developing.countries of the APR have sent an
increasing share of their exports to the United States, in many
cases a significantly larger share. In 1984 the U.S. trade with
the RRCs was roughly in balance, but the U.S. incurred a
merchandise deficit of over $6 billion with the ADCs. The shares
sent to Japan have generally declined or, in a few cases,
remained about the same. For the EC the share changes are mixed
-somerising, some staying the same, and others declining.
Textiles and apparel are the most important category of
imports from the ADCs and China, but products requiring higher
53skills,particularlyelectricalmachineryand electronic
products, are becoming more significant.Oil and gas have long
dominated the RRCs pattern of exports to the United States, but
in recent years electricalandelectronicproducts have
challenged their position as the most important export category.
Clearly, the APR countriesare increasingthe degree of
complexity of their export product mix.
The 1980 volume of direct investment by the United States in
the ADCs was greater than Japan's, but Japanese direct investment
in the entire region was greater than that of the United States.
The United States is, however, increasing the share of its total
investment going to the region, though this share is still quite
small, growing from 3.6% in 1977 to 6.7% in 1984.Oil and gas
and service activities, such as banking and trade, are the
sectors in the APR that receive the largest share of world
investment.Services and manufacturing are the sectors in which
investment in the developing countries of the Asian Pacific Rim
is growing most rapidly.
541. Henceforth, in this paper "APR" will referonly to the
developing countries of the Asian Pacific Rim; Japan is not included.
2. The high proportion of primary product exports forSingapore
reflects the large imports of crude petroleum andre-exports of
refined petroleum products.
3. Hong Kong's rate of population increase isrelatively high
because of immigration.
4. The account of Hong Kong's trade and developmentpolicies is
based on Lin and Mok (1985), Chen (1984), Lin and Ho(1981), and
Cooper (1986).
5. The account of Singapore's trade and development policies is
based on Yue (1980, 1985), Wong (1981), Roberts (1985), and
Cooper (1986).
6. The account of Korea's trade and development policies is based
on Frank (1975), Nam (1981), Hong (1977), Balassa (1986), and
Cooper (1986).
7. The account of Taiwans trade and development policies is
based on Liang and Liang (1981), Kuo and Eel (1986), Ranis and
Schive (1986), Balassa (1981), and Cooper (1986).
558. The account of the Philippines' trade and development policies
is based on Bautista (1980), Baldwin (1975), Alburo and Shepherd
(1986), and Niksch (1986).
9. Philippine export data for 1984 are not yet on the UNCTAD
TradeData tape.
10. The account of Malaysia's trade and development policies is
based on Ariff (1980), Lim (1984), and Niksch (1986).
11. There are no export figures yetonthe UNCTAD Trade Data tape
for 1984.
12. The account of Thailand's trade and development policies is
based on Akrasansee (1977, 1980), World Bank (1980), Ajanant
(1984), and Niksch (1986).
13. The account of Indonesia's trade and development policies is
based on Rosendale (1977), Anwar (1980), World Bank (1981), and
Pitt (1985).
14. The account of China's trade and development policies is
based on Hardt and Boone (1986) and Ahearn (1986).
15. In interpreting the percentages in the table, note that the
1980 and 1984 figures do not include trade data on Taiwan.
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 Table 2. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT RATES
Gross Domestic Invest-Gross Domestic Savings Resource Gap
ment as Share of GDP as Share of GDP (percentages)
(percentages) (percentages)
1960 1984 1960 1984 19601984
Singapore 11 47 3 43 -8 -4
Hong Kong 19 24 1 29 -18 5
Taiwan 20 22 13 33 -7 12
South Korea 11 29 1 30 -10 1
Malaysia 14 31 27 32 13 1
Thailand 16 23 17 21 1 -2
Philippines 16 18 16 18 0 0
Indonesia 8 21 8 20 0 -1
China 25b 30 25 30 0 0
United States 18 19 19 16 1 -3
Japan 34 28 34 31 0 3
West Germany 27 21 29 23 2 2
Australia 29 21 25 19 -4 -2
India 17 24 14 22 -3 -2
a 1965
Sources: World Bank, World Development Rept, 1979.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Country Member
Countries of ADB, 1984.
Asian Development Bank, ADB Annual Report, 1985.Table 3. EXTERNAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT
Total Long-Term Debt Total Long-Term Debt Service
Disbursed & Outstanding as Percentage of Exports of
(millions of dollars) Goods and Services
1970 1984 1970 1984
Singapore 152 1,911a .6
Hong Kong 2a 270a
Taiwan l,195b 6,147c — 4•3c
South Korea 1,972 29,990 20.3 15.8
Malaysia 39O 11,846a 3.6 5.ld
Thailand 726 10,936 14.0 21.5
Philippines 1,494 14,135 7.5° 17.9
Indonesia 2,904 26,683 13.8 19.0
aLong-termpublic and publicly guaranteed debt
bExternalpublic debt outstanding, 1971
°Externalpublic debt outstanding, 1981
'1982, long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt
External public debt outstanding
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1984.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.
Asian Development Bank, y Indicators of Developing

















Singapore 13.0 8.2 11.0 7.1 9.8 7.1 100101
Hong Kong 7.9 9.1 11.712.9 10.6 9.3 110109
Taiwan 7.993a 23.7k16.7c 17.gb 13.5a — —
South Korea 10.0 7.2 31.715.1 22.4 9.7 100100
Malaysia 6.7 7.3 8.0 7.5 4.4 8.9 85 93
Thailand 7.8 6.8 6.9 10.4 4.4 5.9 77 81
Philippines 5.4 4.8 4.2 5.6 3.0 2.3 89101
Indonesia 8.1 6.8 11.1 1.4 14.0 10.5 105101












Bank, World Development Report, 1979.
Bank, World Development Report, 1986.
Development Bank, Key Indicators ofDeveloping Member



































107Table 5. COMMODITY STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION AND TRADE
(percentage shares)
PRODUCTION, 1984 EXPORTS, 1983 IMPORTS
Agricul- Industry Services Primary Manufac- Primary Manufac-
ture Goodstures Goodstures
Singapore 1 39 60 44 56 44 56
Hong Kong 1 22 78 8 92 25 75
Taiwan 6a 94a
South Korea 14 40 47 9 91 49 51
Malaysia 21 35 44 78 22 28 72
Thailand 20 28 52 68 32 36 64
Philippines 25 34 41 49 51 40 60
Indonesia 26 40 34 92 8 38 62
China 36 44 23 43 57 34 66
United States 4 43 54 30 70 37 63
Japan 3 41 56 3 97 77 23
West Germany 2 46 52 13 87 42 58
Australia 77 23 20 80
India 35 27 38 47 53 50 50
a1982
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 6. MERCHANDISE TRADE OF FOUR INDEBTED COUNTRIES
IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC RIM, 1981-1985
(Billions of dollars, exports (f.o.b.), imports (c.i.f.))
Korea Philippines Thailand Indonesia
1981
Exports 21.1 5.7 7.0 22.3
Imports 26.1 8.5 9.9 13.3
Balance 4.9 -2.8 -2.9 9.0
1982
Exports 21.9 5.0 7.0 22.3
Imports 24.3 8.3 8.6 16.9
Balance -2.4 -3.3 -1.6 5.4
1983
Exports 24.5 4.9 6.4 21.1
Imports 26.2 8.0 10.3 16.3
Balance -1.7 -3.1 -3.9 4.8
1984
Exports 29.2 5.3 7.4 21.9
Imports 30.6 6.4 10.4 13.9
Balance -1.4 -1.1 -3.0 8.0
1985
Exports 30.3 4.6 7.1 19.7
Imports 31.1 5.5 9.2 10.2
Balance -.8 -.9 -2.1 9.5
Source: International Trade, 1984-85, Table A-4, and International Trade,
1985-86, Table A-14, both from General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).Table 7.




Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other
and metals primary Clothing Transport Manufac—
commodities Equipment tures
1960 5 15 45 4 31
1978 1 2 •46 15 36
1983 2 6 33 22 36
Imports
Food Fuel Other Machinery Other
primary & TransportManufac-
commodities Equipment tures
1960 27 3 16 10 44
1978 15 5 7 19 54
1983 12 7 6 21 54
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 8
DISTRIBUTION OF HONG KONG'S IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
U.S. 16.5 35.0 19.4 50.3 18.3 40.7 12.1 50.1
Canada 1.9 3.0 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.2 0.6 3.6
Japar 29.3 4.334.2 4.7•33.8 4.228.0 4.2
Au trail a
& N. Z. 0.0 4.9 3.6 4.4 2.7 3.9 1.8 3.5
European
Community31.243.925.629.221.336.313.422.9
ADCs 8.4 0.411.1 4.316.5 5.111.8 3.7
RRCs 8.4 7.8 4.8 2.3 6.1 3.4 2.2 2.6
Chin& 0.2 0.2 2.829.7 9.0
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.Table 9
STRUCTURE OF SINGAPORES MERCHANDISE TRADE,
1960, 1978, AND 1983
(percentage distribution)
Exports
Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other manu—
and metals primary Clothing Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 1 73 5 7 14
1978 31 23 5 25 16
1983 31 13 4 31 22
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 21 15 38 7 21
1978 10 24 9 29 23
1983 7 31 6 30 26
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 10.
DISTRIBUTION OF SINGAPORE'S IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
U.S. 7.3 13.3 12.9 18.9 18.2 17.8 21.7 26.9
Canada 1.8 0.6 2.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 1.0
Japan 16.0 7.7 24.3 13.0 24.0 10.8 28.1 11.8
Australia
& N. Z. 5,7 6.9 5.5 5.]. 3.6 7.9 4.2 5.3
European
Community25.029.917.729.615.015.516.011.9
ADCs 1.6 6.3 5.3 9.6 3.915.1 5.112.3
RRCs 44.2 32.8 33.3 18.8 34.1 29.5 16.2 29.2
China - 0.9 - 2.5 - 2.0 7.7 1.2
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.Table 11




Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other manu-
and metals primary Clothing Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 30 56 8 6
1978 1 10 32 2]. 36
1983 3 6 25 32 34
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transport factures
commoditiesEquipment
1960 10 7 25 12 46
1978 8 16 17 33 26
1983 8 27 14 29 22
Source:World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report. 1986.Table 12
DISTRIBUTION OF KOREA'S IMPORTS FROM MD EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963. 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.
1963 1970 1980 1984
ImportsExportsImportsExportsImportsExports ImportsExports
49.5 32.5 31.]. 50.7 33.7 35.2 33.5 46.4
0.7 0.3 1.1 2.5 3.3 2.6 3.2 3.8











1.8 0.3 0.9 1.0 3.9 1.9 5.3 1.9
7.1 9.3 9.4 8.6 10.0 20.8 10.]. 14.5
4.0 18.4 2.5 5.9 2.3 9.9 2.2 8.9
1.8 4.5 5.2 1.3 6.0 6.3 4.1 3.9
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0Table 13
DISTRIBUTION OF TAIWAN'S IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.
1963 1970 1980
ImportsExportsImportsExportsImportsExportsImportsExports
43.1 19.9 25.7 44.2 33.0- 31.7 —
1.1 2.1 1.3 3.9 1.6- 3.5 —











5.0 1.2 3.0 1.6 3.4-
7.1 10.2 8.7 11.0 9.8 10.4
2.4 20.5 3.3 15.6 5.3 5.6
6.4 7.3 6.0 6.6 6.1 - 2.8
0.0 0•.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.0 0.0
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0 100.0
0.0Table 14
STRUCTURE OF THE PHILJIPPINES MERCHANDISE TRADE,
1960, 1978, AND 1983
(percentage distribution)
Exports
Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other manu—
and metals primary Clothing Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 10 86 1 0 3
1978 14 52 6 2 26
1983 13 36 7 5 38
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 15 10 5 36 34
1978 8 21 7 27 37
1983 8 27 5 21 39
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 15
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES' IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS
TO SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIO4S, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
U.S. 46.4 46.6 30.3 42.7 34.3 26.6 38.6
Canada 2.9 0.1 2.4 0.2 1.6 1.0 1.0
Japan 22.1 28.0 38.0 40.5 29.1 32.7 24.5
Au stra ii a
& N. Z. 2.8 0.3 4.5 0.4 4.2 2.1 3.2
European
Community17.421.717.7 8.714.020.611.8
ADCs 2.4 2.9 2.2 6.7 9.611.010.9
RRCs 5.6 0.0 4.6 0.4 6.9 4.6 4.3
China - - - - - 1.0 5.4
100.0 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Source: UNCTADTradeData tape.Table 16
STRUCTURE OF MALAYSIA'S MERCHANDISE TRADE,
1960, 1978, AND1983
(percentage distribution)
Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other manu-
and metals primary Clothing Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 20 74 6
1978 27 52 2 11 8
1983 35 43 2 14 6
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transport factures
commoditiesEquipment
1960 29 16 13 14 28
1978 17 13 7 34 29
1983 9 14 5 44 28
Source:World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report. 1986.Table 17
DISTRIBUTION OF MALAYSIAS IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS,1963,1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
U.S. - 12.6 10.7 14.9 14.4 18.3 15.6
Canada 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.2 0.9 0.5 1.2
Japan 4.4 24.7 3.6 21.0 23.1 25.7 24.8
Au stra ii a
& N. Z. 2.6 2.5 11.6 3.0 6.2 2.0 4.3
European
Community 16.7248 42.4 23.2 15.7 19.8 11.8
ADCs 66.4 28.8 22.6 30.3 35.2 27.9 36.6
RRCs 9.2 4.1 6.6 3.6 4.3 3.6 3.7
China - 0.1 - 1.4 - 1.8 1.7
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.Table 18
STRUCTURE OF THAILANDS MERCHANDISE TRADE,
1960, 1978, AND 1983
(percentage distribution)
Exports
Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other manu-
and metals primary Clothing Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 7 91 0 0 2
1978 11 64 10 3 12
1983 6 62 1]. 6 15
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 10 11 11 25 43
1978 4 21 9 31 35
1983 4 24 8 29 35
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 19
DISTRIBUTION OF THAILANtYS IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTSTO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980,AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports ImportsExports Imports Exports
U.S. 18.7 9.6 14.8 15.0 19.1 15.3 15.7 22.4
Canada 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.1 2.1 0.4 1.2 1.5
Japan 34.6 25.6 44.9 29.5 33.6 18.9 36.7 17.0
Au st rail a
& N. Z. 1.9 0.3 3.6 0.5 3.2 1.3 2.6 2.3
European
Community 28.7 22.9 24.3 22.2 18.0 32.6 15.9 26.9
ADCs 11.6 26.3 9.6 23.1 18.8 18.0 22.2 19.2
RRCs 1.5 14.9 1.7 9.3 4.9 10.7 1.4 7.].
China - - - - - 2.4 3.8 3.1
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.Table 20
STRUCTURE OF INDONEsIA'S MERCHANDISE TRADE,
1960, 1978, AND 1983
(percentage distribution)
Exports
Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery Other manu-
and metals primary Clothing & Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1960 33 67 0
1978 72 26 1 1
1983 80 12 1 1 6
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transportfactures
commoditiesEquipment
1960 23 5 10 17 45
1978 18 9 6 36 31
1983 8 25 5 35 28
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 2].
DISTRIBUTION OF INDONESIA'S IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
U.S. 21.8 - 28.2 15.9 17.3 20.9 16.8 22.4
Canada 0.2 - 1.7 0.0 2.2 0.1 3.]. 0.2
Japan 20.7 - 34.5 37.9 42.8 52.5 43.0 51.7
Au stral i a
& N. Z. 0.8 3.9 3.9 5.3 2.1 4.0 2.4
European
Community 29.2 23.2 18.4 22.3 6.9 26.8 5.3
ADCs 19.3 5.2 20.8 5.2 15.9 4.3 15.9
RRCs 7.6 3.0 2.8 4.6 1.3 0.6 1.8
China - -. - 0.0 - - 0.9 0.0
100.0 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0 100.0
Source: iJNCTAD Trade Data tape.Table 22




Fuels, minerals Other Textiles & Machinery & Other manu-
and metals primary Clothing Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1978 13 38 24 3 22
1983 22 21 19 6 32
Imports
Food Fuels Other Machinery Other manu-
primary & Transport factures
commodities Equipment
1978 17 0 43 18 22
1983 15 1 18 19 47
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1986.Table 23
DISTRIBUTION OF CHINAS IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO
SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980 1984
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
U.S. 0.0 - - 26.5 - 17.9 12.1
Canada 18.5 - 10.1 5.2 - 5.5 1.3
Japan 11.9 - 42.3 35.5 - 43.026.9
AUst ra ii a
& N. Z. 38.6 9.9 6.5 5.1 1.3
European
Community 29.1 33.8 19.0 17.4 11.5
ADCs 1.2 2.0 4.2 9.742.7
RRCs 0.3 1.6 2.7 1.1 3.9
China - -. - - - - - -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0
Source: UNCTADTrade Data tape.Table 24
DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM
























































SHARES OF THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED FOREIGN COMPETITORS
IN EXPORTS TO APR COUNTRIESa
(in percentages)
1963 1970 1980b 1984b
ADCs RRCs China ADCsRRCs ChinaADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China
Total Exports from All Row Countries
U.S. 20 24 0 18 20 0 21 16 27 21 16 18
Canada 1 1 18 1 2 10 1 1 5 2 1 6
Japan 22 21 12 33 30 42 2826 36 3026 43
Aust.&N.Z. 3 2 39 3 5 10 3 4 7 3 3 5
EC 1720 29 1422 39 12 14 19 11 13 17
ADCsC 823 1 10 15 2 1230 4 12 35 10
RRCSC 29 9 0 21 7 2 23 8 3 11 4 1
ChHa 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 10 2
Natural Resource-Intensive Exports from All Row countriesd
U.S. 21 22 0 20 27 0 2013 52 23 13 28
Canada 1 3 26 1 2 28 2 3 12 4 3 20
7 7 2 13 13 9 8 7 7 10 6 11
Aust.&N.Z. 6 3 55 5 9 27 5 10 15 9 8 19
EC 7 8 14 7 10 26 5 5 4 6 5 11
ADCsC 934 2 8 19 5 13 40 3 13 47 7
RRCsC 4923 0 4620 4 50 22 6 24 12 4
China 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 11 6Table 25. (cont.)
SHARES OF THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED FOREIGN COMPETITORS
IN EXPORTS TO APR COUNTRIESa
1963 1970 1980b _______________
AOCsRRCs ChinaADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCsChina
Labor—Intensive Exports from All Row Countriesd
U.S. 1120 0 6 13 0 7 7 22 5 7 6
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Japan 4933 35 5337 40 42 23 47 31 24 37
Aust. & N.Z. 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
EC 21 8 59 12 13 60 12 8 8 9 8 4
ADCsC 1337 6 2633 2 27 56 21 1854 51
RRCsC 5 2 0 2 3 0 10 4 2 4 4 1
China 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 32 2
Technology-Intensive Exports from All Row Countriesd
U.S. 2330 0 2420 0 27 22 15 25 20 22
Canada 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan 3523 32 4334 56 3932 50 4032 44
Aust.&N.Z. 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
EC 3332 68 23 33 44 17 20 30 15 17 23
ADCsC 2 12 0 6 8 0 8 22 5 11 28 9
RRCSC 5 1 0 2 - 1 0 7 2 0 4 1 0
China 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 3 0 -Table 25. (cont.)
SHARES OF THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED FOREIGN COMPETITORS
IN EXPORTS TO APR COUNTRIESa
Human Capital-Intensive Exports from All Row countriesd
1963—1970 1980b 1984b —
ADCsRRCs ChinaADCs RRCs ChinaADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China
U.S. 14 17 0 9 9 0 9 4 4 9 3 1
Canada 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 0
Japan 47 41 43 59 50 71 63 51 70 5947 79
Aust. & N.Z. 2 1 6 3 6 0 3 3 5 1 2 2
EC 2624 51 16 18 29 13 11 17 16 13 15
ADCSC 4 16 0 9 16 0 8 28 1 7 32 2
RRCsC 7 1 0 3 1 0 3 2 1 2 1 0
China 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 — 4 1 -
ash of total exports of countries listed.
b . . Datafor Taiwan are not included in the 1980 and 1984 figures, since the United
Nations no longer recognizes Taiwan as a separate country and therefore UN
agencies no longer collect data on Taiwan.
CThe shares of the ADCs and RRCs in their own regions measure trade within these
regions.
dlhe commodity breakdown into goods that are natural resource-intensive,
unskilled labor-intensive, technology-intensive, and human capital-intensive is
adapted from Krause (1984).
Source: UNClAD Trade Data tape.Table 26
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM APR




ADCsRRCsChinaADCsRRCs ChinaADCs RRCs China
SIC Industries
Agricultural
-Crops (1) 23 14 26 11 28 18 10 51
Food & kindred
products (20) 9 13 7 2 0 5 3 1
Lumber & wood
products (24) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
Chemicals 8 8 7 12 2 10 11 22
Primary metal
industries (33) 2 2 3 5 19 2 2 3
Fabricated metal
products (34) 7 4 4 4 13 5 4 0
Machinery, exc.
electrical(35) 1.3 24 16 29 30 18 22 5
Elect. & electronic
machinery (36)9 6 14 17 1 16 27 2
Transportation
equipment (37) 13 13 10 9 1 7 9 1
All other
products 15 16 13 11 6 18 22 8
Source: Trade data bank of author.
-Anindustry is included if the export or export share of the industry is
at least 5% in any region in any of the three years.Table 26 (cont.)
Imports
1968 1975 1982
ADCsRR China ADCsRRChina ADCs RR China
SIC Industries
Agricultural
—Crops (1) 0 15 0 2 5 0 3 1
Agricultural-
Livestock (2) 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 1
Forestry (8) 1 16 0 7 0 0 5 0
Oil & gas (13) 0 5 0 41 0 0 30 8
Food & kindred
products (20) 4 27 4 17 4 1 7 5
Textile
products (22) 10 1 8 1 22 3 1 10
Apparel (23) 26 3 - 24 3 7 22 6 28
Lumber & wood
products (24) 10 6 5 2 3 2 2 3
Chemicals (28) 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 6
Petroleum
products (29) 0 0 1 5 0 1 3 18
Rubber & misc.
plastic
products (30') 6 0 6 0 0 4 0 1
Leather & leather
products (31) 2 0 3 0 1 10 1 3
Primary metal
industries (33) 0 18 3 6 29 4 3 3
Electrical &
electronic
machinery (36) 16 0 0 23 10 1 23 30 1
Miscellaneous
mfg.(39) 7 1 3 9 1 3 11 2 3
All other
































Exports by the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia
European Community, the ADCs, the RRCs, and China.
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.
and New Zealand, the
Table 27
COMPARATIVE GROWTH RATES BY FACTOR-INTENSITY BREAKDOWNS OF EXPORTS
TO APR COUNTRIES, 1963-1970, 1970-1980, AND 1980-1984



























COMPOSITION OF U.S. EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM SELECTED REGIONS




Exports ImportsExports ImportsExports Imports
ADCs 38 15 41 26 42 27
RRCs 24 0 40 25 52 54
China 14 6. 53 4
South Asia 30 0 42 1 42 4
European Community 42 13 41 17 47 20
Japan 32 26 33 25 37 30
Australia/New Zealand 41 1]. 40 21 41 29
Canada 19 4 16 5 23 11
World 31 13 31 16 37 20
Non-Technology-Intensive
ADCs 62 85 59 74 58 73
RRCs 76 100 60 75 48 46
China 86 94 47 96
South Asia 70 100 58 99 58 96
European Community 58 87 59 83 53 80
Japan 68 74 67 75 63 70
Australia/New Zealand59 89 59 79 59 71
Canada 81 96 85 95 77 89
World 69 87 69 84 63 80
Source: Trade data bank of author.Table 29
ESTIMATED ORDER OF RELATIVE FACTOR-PRICE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED COUNTRIES OR REGIONS, 19782
1The t statistic is in parentheses under each coefficient.








































































































































DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL EXPORTS OF APR COUNTRIES TO THE UNITED STATES
ANDOTHERSELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, 1963, 1970, 1980, AND 1984
(in percentages)
1963 1970
ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China
United States18.5 19.0 - 37.0 17.9
Canada 1.7 0.8 2.8 0.7
Japan 11.2 20.9 11.9 25.0
Australia & NZ3.8 1.1 2.8 1.7
EC 23.8 18.9 18.2 14.6
ADCs 12.3 31.6 15.1 33.8
RRCs 28.1 7.2 11.3 5.5
China 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1980 1984
ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China
United States24.6 16.4 34.4 18.7 12.1
Canada 1.7 0.3 2.4 0.4 1.3
Japan 10.5 31.8 10.9 36.8 26.9
Australia & NZ3.7 1.6 2.8 2.0 1.3
EC 18.9 12.3 13.4 8.4 11.5
ADCs 16.7 31.0 14.2 27.9 42.7
RRCs 22.1 5.6 19.2 4.9 3.9
100.0 100.0 iTh 100.0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Data tape.Table 31.
OUTSTANDING DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1980
(million $)
Investmentby: United States Japan
Investment ifl: Amount Amount
Japan 6,274 -—
UnitedStates 8,878
South Korea 587 1,137
Taiwan 510 370






Subtotal: ASEAN 4,752 7,021
ADMEa 7,818 9,623
World Total 213,460 36,497
a
ADME stands for Advanced Developing Market Economies.
Source: Hugh Patrick, "The Asian Developing Market Economies --HowThey Have
Affected and Been Affected By the United States-Japan Economic
Relationship." Paper presented at conference, The United States,
Japan, and Southeast Asia: The Issues of Interdependence, Maui,
Hawaii, December 14-18, 1983.Table 32.
PERCENTAGE COUNTRY SHARES OF ALL U.S. FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AN INDUSTRY, 1977
All MiningPetr. TotalFoodCheni.Prim. Mach. Elect.
Industries Mfg. Metal exc. Eqpt.
Fab. Elect.
Eoot.
0.7 a 2.6 0.2 0.00.3 a * 0.2
0.3 0.1 a 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8
0.6 * 1.0 0.5 1.80.7 0.3 0.0 0.6
0.4 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.8
0.2 0.1 a 0.1 0.20.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
0.3 0.0 a 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.0 a 0.3
0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.20.4 0.0 0.0 1.6


















Transp. Other Trade Bank— Finance




* a 0.1 0.2 0.0 a
* 0.1 a 0.2 0.0 0.2
a a 0.5 2.1 0.1 0.7
0.0 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.5
* 0.1 a 0.6 0.0 0.1
a 0.0 a 0.4 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0
* a 2.2 3.0 0.8 2.5
+$500,000. * Indicatesan amount between -$500,000 and
aSuppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S._Direct_InvetmL94_j,
Washington, D.C., April 1981.Table 32. (cont.)
PERCENTAGE COUNTRY SHARES OF ALL U.S. FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AN INDUSTRY, 1984
All MiningPetr. TotalFood CheniPrim.Mach. Elect.
Industries Mfg. Metal exc. Eqpt.
Country Fab. Elect.
________ Egpt.
Indonesia 1.9 a 6.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 a 0.0 0.3
Malaysia 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.4 a0.1 0.1 a 3.1
Philippines 0.5 0.0 a 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 a
Singapore 1.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 a0.5 1.2 a 5.2
Thailand 0.4 0.2 a a 0.0 02 a 0.0 a
Korea 0.4 0.0 a 0.2 0.50.0 a a 1.0
Taiwan 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.20.6 D a 1.8
Hong Kong 1.6 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.20.7 0.9 a 2.0
Transp. OtherTrade Bank- Finance Other
Eqpt. Mfg. ing exceptIndustries
Banking
Indonesia 0.0 a 0.2 0.2 0.0 a
Malaysia a 0.2 0.3 0.1 a a
Philippines a a 0.2 2.0 a a
Singapore a a 1.0 1.6 0.5 0.8
Thailand a a 0.2 0.4 0.0 a
Korea 0.3 0.1 0.4 1.6 a a
Taiwan 0.2 a 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.1
Hong Kong 0.0 a 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.7
a
Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1977,
Washington, D.C., April 1981.Table 33.
PERCENTAGE INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION OF A COUNTRY'S TOTAL
DIRECT INVESTMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1977
MiningPetr. TotalFood Chem. Prim. Mach. Elect.
Mfg. Metal exc. Eqpt.
Country Elect.
________ Egpt.
Indonesia 0.9 74.8 9.9 0.23.0 a 0.0 1.3
Malaysia 0.0 a18.5 0.63.2 0.40.9 9.9
Philippines 0.0 32.637.911.9 10.5 1.7 0.1 4.1
Singapore 0.0 45.020.5 1.00.6 5.42.9 8.7
Thailand 2.5 a21.5 3.83.8 1.7 0.0 4.6
Korea 0.0 a41.5 2.0 22.8 0.3 a 4.3
Taiwan 0.0 6.268.73.5 19.7 0.4 1.2 34.0
HongKong 0.0 20.4 15.1 0.43.8 a 1.2 4.4
Transp.OtherTradeBank-Finance Other
Eqpt. Mfg. ing exceptIndustries
Banking
Indonesia 0.0 a 0.9 0.8 0.5 a
Malaysia a 3.2 a 1.7 0.4 3.0
Philippines a a 9.1 11.1 3.1 6.2
Singapore 0.2 1.7 14.5 9.5 3.5 7.2
Thailand 0.0 7.6 a 11.4 2.5 3.4
Korea a 1.3 a 4.3 2.8 2.3
Taiwan 2.7 6.9 8.5 13.9 1.9 0.8
Hong Kong 0.0 a 28.2 10.0 12.3 13.9
aSuppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1977,
Washington, D.C., April 1981.Table 33. (cont.)
PERCENTAGE INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION OF A COUNTRY'S TOTAL
DIRECT INVESTMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1984
a
Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies.












a 88.3 3.4 0.30.9 a 0.0 0.6
0.2 62.4 32.1 a2.5 0.8 a 23.2
0.0 a37.4 8.815.0 1.9 0.4 a
0.0 24.045.4 a4.3 3.4 a 20.4
1.1 a a 0.24.8 a 0.0 a
0.0 a25.6 5.7 1.1 a a 10.2
0.0 12.856.0 1.915.6 0.0 a 19.1
0.0 9.2 16.6 0.53.8 1.4 4.7
Country








Indonesia 0.0 a 1.2 0.7 0.2 a
Malaysia a 3.6 8.3 1.6 a a
Philippines a a 4.6 22.0 a a
Singapore a a 13.7 9.4 3.2 4.3
Thailand 0.0 a 7.9 5.7 0.2 a
Korea 3.5 2.6 13.2 26.1 a a
Taiwan 3.1 a 14.5 13.8 0.7 2.2
Hong Kong 0.0 a 30.0 13.5 15.7 15.1
Transp. Other
Eqpt. Mfg.
TradeBank-Finance
ing except
Bankinq
Other
Industries